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Background: Despite the recent innovations in tuberculosis (TB) and multi-drug resistant TB (MDR-TB) diagnosis,
culture remains vital for difficult-to-diagnose patients, baseline and end-point determination for novel vaccines and
drug trials. Herein, we share our experience of establishing a BSL-3 culture facility in Uganda as well as 3-years
performance indicators and post-TB vaccine trials (pioneer) and funding experience of sustaining such a facility.
Methods: Between September 2008 and April 2009, the laboratory was set-up with financial support from external
partners. After an initial procedure validation phase in parallel with the National TB Reference Laboratory (NTRL) and
legal approvals, the laboratory registered for external quality assessment (EQA) from the NTRL, WHO, National Health
Laboratories Services (NHLS), and the College of American Pathologists (CAP). The laboratory also instituted a
functional quality management system (QMS). Pioneer funding ended in 2012 and the laboratory remained in
self-sustainability mode.
Results: The laboratory achieved internationally acceptable standards in both structural and biosafety requirements.
Of the 14 patient samples analyzed in the procedural validation phase, agreement for all tests with NTRL was 90%
(P <0.01). It started full operations in October 2009 performing smear microscopy, culture, identification, and drug
susceptibility testing (DST). The annual culture workload was 7,636, 10,242, and 2,712 inoculations for the years 2010,
2011, and 2012, respectively. Other performance indicators of TB culture laboratories were also monitored. Scores from
EQA panels included smear microscopy >80% in all years from NTRL, CAP, and NHLS, and culture was 100% for CAP
panels and above regional average scores for all years with NHLS. Quarterly DST scores from WHO-EQA ranged from
78% to 100% in 2010, 80% to 100% in 2011, and 90 to 100% in 2012.
Conclusions: From our experience, it is feasible to set-up a BSL-3 TB culture laboratory with acceptable quality
performance standards in resource-limited countries. With the demonstrated quality of work, the laboratory attracted
more research groups and post-pioneer funding, which helped to ensure sustainability. The high skilled experts in this
research laboratory also continue to provide an excellent resource for the needed national discussion of the laboratory
and quality management systems.
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Tuberculosis (TB) remains a global emergency especially
in resource-limited settings [1]. Laboratory diagnosis is
vital for the control of pulmonary TB. Even with available
new diagnostics, culture remains the most sensitive diag-
nostic method, especially among HIV-infected patients
and infants as well as for novel TB vaccines and drugs tri-
als for baseline and end-point determination [2,3].
The emergence of multidrug resistant (MDR) and ex-
tensively drug resistant TB has increased the need to es-
tablish more facilities for culture-based drug susceptibility
testing (DST), at least until better molecular tests that
offer a complete set of DST results needed for patient
management become available. Recently, the World
Health Organization (WHO) endorsed the use of the
Xpert MTB/RIF assay (Cepheid, Sunnyvale, CA, USA)
as a major tool for rapid and sensitive detection of rifam-
picin resistance [2,4]. However, Xpert rifampicin resistant
results need to be carefully interpreted with consideration
of the risk of MDR-TB in a given patient and the expected
prevalence of MDR-TB in a given setting [4]. Also, add-
itional drug resistance profiles are required for manage-
ment and treatment monitoring of MDR-TB patients for
which currently no alternatives to culture-based DST have
been endorsed.
The WHO biosafety guidelines stipulate that any ma-
nipulation of samples suspected of containing MDR M.
tuberculosis should be conducted in a biosafety level 3
(BSL-3) facility [5]. Culture for TB is routine in most
high-income countries, however, with the initial and op-
erational requirements associated with this type of la-
boratory, it may not be affordable by most low-income
countries that are highly burdened with TB [6-8]. There-
fore, for middle- and low-income countries, the WHO
recommends a stepwise approach with regards to the
introduction of culture and DST, especially on liquid
media systems [5].
Uganda, with a population of 34,509,000 people, has an
approximate TB incidence of 193/100,000 population/year
with an estimated TB incidence among the HIV-infected
of 53/100,000 population/year [1]. In 2012, the prevalence
of MDR-TB was 1.2% and 12% among new and retreat-
ment cases, respectively [1,9]. There is only one public TB
culture laboratory in Uganda, although there are, in
addition, four clinical research TB culture laboratories that
do not participate in routine patient care. Sharing experi-
ences in the setting-up of a BSL-3 laboratory and other
operational issues may guide the decentralization pro-
cesses to the areas where TB culture services can easily be
accessible to TB patients, especially the HIV-infected and
MDR-TB suspects. It can also help in realizing the re-
search and development agenda towards TB control.
Herein, we share our experience of establishing a BSL-3
culture facility in Uganda as well as 3-years performanceindicators and post-TB vaccine trials (pioneer) and fund-
ing experience of sustaining such a facility.
Legal and operational framework of TB laboratories in
Uganda
The objectives of constructing the current laboratory at
Makerere University Teaching Hospital were to partici-
pate in TB-related clinical research, training health care
workers, and to work in collaboration with the National
TB Reference Laboratory (NTRL) towards TB control
through sharing evidence-based data and information.
According to the Uganda National Health Laboratory
Services Policy in 2009, at the national level, the NTRL
and the Central Public Health Laboratories oversee the ac-
tivities of all public TB laboratories, which currently only
perform sputum smear microscopy [10]. The current
laboratory is under Makerere University’s National Teach-
ing and Referral Hospital, so it is legally under the Minis-
try of Education and Sports but also works closely with
the Ministry of Health through training health workers. It
existed on the ground of bridging the gap between oper-
ational and clinical or biomedical research, as it was a big
task for the NTRL/Central Public Health Laboratories to
conduct both types of research fully, in addition to patient
care, supervision of other laboratories, and conducting op-
erational/implementation research.
Biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) laboratory
A BSL-3 laboratory is a containment facility that enables
the isolation and manipulation of organisms belonging to
risk group three of infectious organisms. These organisms
are categorized as having high individual risk and low
community risk. The pathogens in this class usually cause
serious human and animal disease and do not ordinarily
spread from an infected individual to another. For risk
group three organisms, effective treatment and preventa-
tive measures are available [11]. Standards for BSL-3 allow
manipulation of pathogens that can be transmitted
through aerosols. Organisms that are more risky than level
three, i.e., risk group four, such as those causing Ebola, are
handled in maximum containment laboratories with
biosafety level four standards [7,11]. While set-up and
maintenance of such facilities is less affordable in most
low-income countries, the steady increase in complex
public health problems and the outbreak of serious disease
is likely to lead to increased demand for such facilities.
Methods
Establishing the laboratory: from the first stone to
operational approval
Laboratory design and construction
Between September 2008 and April 2009 a BSL-3 TB
culture laboratory measuring 4.5 meters by 6.5 meters
wide was constructed in Makerere University College of
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We considered building the structure instead of buying
a modular laboratory because we thought that a modular
design may not be easy to sustain and durable given the
challenges in our setting in terms of environment, elec-
tricity instability, and lack of technical expertise in case
of system breakdown.
It was set to participate in the planned Phase III TB vac-
cine trials among infants and adolescents. The facility was
constructed and equipped with financial support from
Aeras Global TB Vaccine Foundation. Makerere Univer-
sity offered in-kind contribution in terms of space for
construction, an architectural consultant, water, and
electricity, and facilitated the laboratory’s legalization.
Following Ministry of Public Services guidelines, a labora-
tory manager was recruited to oversee the construction,
follow-up on agreed upon construction milestones, and
operation of the proposed TB culture laboratory. A local
architectural firm was identified for the design using the
WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual 2004 [11] as a refer-
ence guide for specifications. The Uganda Ministry of
Health guidelines for establishing a laboratory as well as
Ministry of Public Services guidelines for identifying local
constructors were followed throughout this process. Bio-
safety standards from WHO, 2004 [11], were used as a ref-
erence guide by an independent firm of engineers and
architects to verify compliance with the WHO laboratory
biosafety design and facilities requirements.
Laboratory equipment and human resources
Funders were requested to purchase the identified equip-
ment directly from the suppliers following their national
guidelines. The cost for laboratory construction in the
year 2009 was approximately US$ 130,000. Start-up equip-
ment included two incubators, a –80°C and a –20°C
freezer, four refrigerators, three class II biosafety cabinets,
a centrifuge, two fluorescence microscopes, a halogen
Olympus BX51 and a light-emitting diode (LED) Olympus
CX31 (Fraen Corporation S.r.l.-USA), a weighing balance,
a pH meter, an autoclave, a 100 KVA back-up generator, a
central UPS and power stabilizer, four carbon dioxide gas
supplies, two mycobacterial growth indicator tube (MGIT)
machines (Becton and Dickson, Franklin Lakes, NJ, USA),
and an ultrasonic cleaning bath, as well as other supplies
and equipment. The equipment cost amounted to US$
242,324, and the apparatus and glassware costs to US$
22,496. Start-up consumables and reagents for one year
cost US$ 134,655. The partners supported the laboratory
with full operational costs, including salaries, additional
reagents, and supplies, continuously for their specified
study period. It was anticipated that at the end of the
planned study period, the laboratory would be fully
supported by Makerere University and its collaborators
for sustainability. The studies ended in 2011 and thelaboratory currently depends on contributions from
other research projects in terms of user fees.
During and after its construction, the laboratory re-
ceived technical support from partners to ensure that the
code of practice as well as health and medical surveillance
requirements for a BSL-3 laboratory, as specified by the
WHO biosafety guidelines, were realized. Additional files
1,2,3 and 4 show the main operational areas of the BSL-3
laboratory. More support to register for external quality
assessment (EQA) from partners as part of preparedness
activities for participation in the planned Phase III TB vac-
cine trials among infants and adolescents and inter-
national accreditation was also offered. On the 15th of
September 2009, the laboratory was approved by the
Ministry of Health of Uganda to operate as a TB culture
facility and also fulfilled the WHO requirements for a
BSL-3 laboratory classification [11]. Thereafter, the lab
manager received a further one-month training in man-
aging a BSL-3 facility from St. Johns Academy of Health
Sciences Institute of Infectious Diseases, Bangalore, India.
Later two graduate laboratory technologists and one
graduate data administrator were recruited and the la-
boratory manager and the laboratory supervisor, who had
prior experience in TB culture procedures, trained them.
All personnel were recruited following the Uganda Minis-
try of Public Services guidelines and fully paid by funders
of the TB vaccine trial through the study period. In order
to save time for the planned studies to begin and not to
“reinvent the wheel”, standard operating procedures
(SOPs) were adopted from St. Johns Academy and from
the NTRL and customized to the current laboratory set-
ting in reference to standard smear microscopy and
culture procedures [12,13]. Laboratory activities: from
Validation phase to full force testing.
Validation phase
Once all equipment were in place, validation activities for
the newly customized SOPs and reliability of the new
equipment were conducted. This was performed using
routine sputum samples from routine TB patients attend-
ing Mulago National Referral Hospital, which were tested
in parallel with the NTRL from March to June 2009. Sam-
ples from routine TB patients were used to reduce delays
that would have been required due to approvals and con-
senting processes if patients had been approached. Each
sample was parallel tested using LED fluorescence smear
microscopy (Ziehl-Neelsen was not done), culture using
home-made Lowenstein-Jensen (LJ) media, commercial
MGIT and identification for MGIT using Capillia Neo
TB™ (TAUN, Numazu, Japan), and the laboratory used
morphological identification for colonies observed on LJ
in accordance with the same SOPs. To test the SOPs,
technical competency, and the equipment used for DST,
10 American Type Culture Collection strains of H37RV
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100% reproducibility.
A validation phase was planned with the NTRL, which
had similar equipment and procedures. The reference la-
boratory, NTRL, was selected due to the fact that it had a
registered decade-long record of competence in these tests
and it is currently a supra-national TB reference labora-
tory with ISO15189 accreditation [14]. Results from
NTRL were considered as the reference results and the
acceptable level of agreement and reproducibility to start
analyzing patient’s sputum samples was set at 80% and
above for all methods. This was also adopted for all EQA
programs thereafter. As planned, corrective and prevent-
ive action projects for discordant results were performed.
The laboratory started full operations in October 2009
performing fluorescence smear microscopy, culture,
identification, and DST according to internationally ac-
cepted safety, technical and quality standards for TB cul-
ture [15,16], and in the same period registered for EQA
panels. The panels were from the WHO, the National
Health Laboratory Services (NHLS), and the College of
American Pathologists (CAP). All smear microscopyTable 1 Laboratory design and main equipment in BSL-3 labo




Isolationa of laboratory Yes Yes
Room sealable for decontamination Yes Yes
Ventilation
Inward airflow Yes Yes
Controlled ventilating system Yes
HEPA-filtered air exhaust Yes/Nob
Double-door entry Yes Yes
Airlock No No
Airlock with shower No No
Anteroom Yes Yes
Anteroom with shower Yes/Noc No
Effluent treatment Yes/Noc No
Autoclave
On site Yes Yes
In laboratory room Desirable Yes
Double-ended Desirable No
Biological safety cabinets Yes Yes
Personnel safety monitoring capabilityd Desirable Yes
aEnvironmental and functional isolation from general traffic.
bDependent on location of exhaust.
cDependent on agent(s) used in the laboratory.
dFor example, window, closed-circuit television, two-way communication.examination was performed by the auramine-O-phenol
fluorescence method. Laboratory performance was
assessed using the standard performance indicators for
mycobacteriology laboratories. Early and continuous
corrective and preventative projects were implemented
for non-compliances.
Ethical considerations
This study was nested in the main TB vaccine prepara-
tory study that was approved by the Makerere University
School of Public Health–Higher Degrees and Research
Ethics committee (HDREC), Kampala Uganda and the
Uganda National Council of Science and Technology
(UNCST).
Results
Laboratory design and biosafety
The laboratory met the structural and biosafety require-
ments as stipulated by the WHO Laboratory Biosafety
Manual, 3rd edition, for BSL-3 laboratories [11]. Tables 1
and 2 and Additional files 1,2,3 and 4 show the items as
expected and achieved.ratory according to WHO biosafety guidelines
tory Description
On the topmost level of the building with highly restricted access
All windows are sealed and checked for leakages
Inward airflow and ventilation system is automatically monitored
with auto-sensors and two Magnehelic® gauges (for supply and
exhaust each) and re-validated and certified annually by Air-filter
maintenance services (AFMS) group of South Africa
Doors are well sealed
Anteroom is under negative pressure
All effluent is decontaminated in the BSL-3 laboratory before is
discharged to join the sewage system of the National Referral
Hospital (Mulago)
Inside the containment section of the laboratory
Well serviced by AFMS annually
Reception and the laboratory sections are connected to intercom
system and CCTV camera with a link to the laboratory manager
and director’s offices
Table 2 Containment laboratory – biosafety level 3: laboratory safety survey checklist adopted from WHO biosafety
manual, 3rd edition [11]
Item Achieved Frequency/description
Personal protection Yes There are two sets of gowns clearly labelled to differentiate those
strictly used in containment section
Closed-front gowns worn in laboratory
Protective laboratory clothing worn only in laboratory areas Yes All section have their respective clothing readily available in areas
of use
Hand-washing sink foot, elbow or automatically controlled Yes With elbow operated tapes
Hand protection Yes All areas where infectious materials are handled have sign post
for use of gloves as a reminder
Double gloves worn when handling infectious material, potentially
contaminated equipment and work surfaces
Respiratory protection Yes All samples are checked for leakages before accessioning and
processed inside a class II biosafety cabinet
Respiratory protection worn by all personnel in the laboratory when
aerosols are not safely contained in a biosafety cabinet (BSC)
Practices Yes N95 masks, gaggles, and head-dress are available and strictly used
when handling chemicals and materials that can affect mucous
membraneMucous membrane protection provided when working with
infectious material outside a BSC
Personnel advised of special hazards associated with the agent(s) Yes Through biosafety manual and initial and refresher trainings. All
SOPs have a safety precaution section
Personnel required to read and follow all instructions on practices
and procedures, including safety or operations manual
Yes This is quarterly checked through internal audits and safety audits
Personnel receive annual updates/additional training for procedural
changes
Yes Through in-house training facilitated by biosafety officer or external
trainings; also key points are emphasized during biosafety meetings
All contaminated waste autoclaved prior to disposal Yes Using disinfectants and autoclave before disposal
Table 3 Validation results by parallel testing with the
National TB Reference Laboratory (NTRL) as reference
(n = 14)
Current laboratory NTRL
Test method Results Positive Negative Total
Smear microscopy Positive 7 0 7




Sputum culture (MGIT) Positive (MTBc) 7 0 7




Sputum culture (LJ) Positive (MTBc) 6 0 6




LJ, Lowenstein-Jensen; MGIT, Mycobacterial growth indicator tube; MTBc,
Mycobacterium tuberculosis complex.
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Only 14 randomly selected patient samples were ana-
lyzed during the validation phase due to the limited time
that was allocated for this exercise before the studies
could begin. All samples tested in parallel with NTRL
for smear microscopy and culture on both LJ and MGIT
had kappa values of 0.9 (P <0.01; Table 3). The DST re-
sults had 100% reproducibility scores for the drugs tested,
namely streptomycin, isoniazid, rifampicin, and etham-
butol (data not shown).
Laboratory performance indicators (2010 to 2012)
Standard performance indicators for TB culture labora-
tories [17,18] were also calculated and interpreted on a
weekly, monthly, and quarterly basis for continuous
quality improvement projects. Here, results from January
2010 to December 2012 are presented.
From January 2010 to December 2012, the laboratory
performed 20,590 cultures on both MGIT and LJ
methods, of which 37.1% (7,636) were for 2010, 49.7%
(10,242) were for 2011, and 13.2% (2,712) were for 2012.
Of these 20,590 cultures, 50.9% (10,490) were performed
on LJ and 49.1% (10,100) on MGIT. All samples were
from clinical research studies.
In the years 2010, 2011, and 2012, the contamination
rates for LJ culture were 1.8% (70/3,818), 5.5% (287/
5,186), and 3.2% (48/1,486), whereas contamination rates
for MGIT cultures were 8.2% (314/3,818), 26.1% (1,321/
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These percentages were compared to internationally-
accepted standards (2% to 5% for LJ and 6% to 10% for
MGIT), and corrective and preventive action projects
were initiated for non-conformity. The mycobacterium
tuberculosis complex (MTBc) positivity rates by LJ cul-
tures were 1.8% (69/3,818), 13.2% (683/5,186), and 30.1%
(447/1,486), whereas for MGIT cultures these were 2.8%
(107/3,818), 15.4% (777/5,056), and 28.7% (352/1,226)
for the years 2010, 2011, and 2012, respectively. There
was an increase in the number of smear-positive but
culture-negative patients from 0.6% to 6.9% on LJ and
0.2% to 1.7% on MGIT between the years 2010 and
2012. Table 4 summarizes the performance for culture
methods in relation to smear microscopy.
In December 2009, the laboratory registered to par-
ticipate in quarterly EQA procedures with the NHLS,
South Africa, and through the NTRL, in the WHO
DST EQA panel from the Supranational TB Reference
Laboratory at the Institute of Tropical Medicine,
Antwerp, Belgium. In the fourth quarter of 2011, the
laboratory was registered for CAP EQA panels. All
these EQA procedures checked the available standard
tests for patient management.
Laboratory performance in EQA panels from 2010 to 2012
The laboratory performed with a reproducibility of 80%
and above throughout the years of participation in theTable 4 Performance of culture in relation to smear microsco
Culture method Performance indicator




Smear negative among culture positive
Smear positive among culture positive
Smear positive among culture contaminated
Smear positive among culture negative
MGIT culture Total (n)
Culture positive M. tuberculosis (MTBc)
Culture negative
Culture positive with MOTT
Culture contaminated
MOTT among smear positive
Smear negative among culture positive (MTBc)
Smear positive among culture positive (MTBc)
Smear positive among culture contaminated
Smear positive among culture negative
Mycobacterial identifications on LJ were done basing on morphological features an
LJ, Lowenstein-Jensen; MGIT, Mycobacterial growth indicator tube; MOTT, MycobacWHO DST EQA panels for all drugs except for 2010 on
rifampicin and ethambutol. There was good to fair base-
line performance in the year 2010 with an increase in
scores in 2011 and 2012 (Figure 1). For the quarterly
smear microscopy EQA panels with NTRL [3], there
was exceptional performance of 100% across quarters of
the years with slight reduction in scores in the year 2012
(Figure 2).
With the CAP EQA panels, the laboratory scored 100%
for smear microscopy and sputum culture across the
participation period, with a reduction in scores to 70%
for antimycobacterial susceptibility/DST in one quarter
(Figure 3). For the NHLS EQA panel participation for
smear microscopy, culture, identification, and suscepti-
bility, the laboratory had between acceptable and fair
scores (80% and above and 75% and above, respectively)
in all rounds of participation (Figure 4).
Discussion
This experience from Uganda indicates that, with collab-
orative efforts, funding, and technical support from lo-
cally available expertise, it is feasible to set-up and
optimally operate a BSL-3 TB culture and DST facility
with acceptable quality performance in a resource-
limited setting. Knowing the national and international
requirements for construction and equipment procure-
ment as well as personnel recruitment prior to initial
laboratory set-up is key to achieving the set start-uppy (2010–2012)
2010 N (%) 2011 N (%) 2012 N (%)
3,818 5,186 1,486
69 (1.8) 683 (13.2) 447 (30.1)
3,749 (98.2) 4,503 (86.8) 1,039 (69.9)
70 (1.8) 287 (5.5) 48 (3.2)
19 (27.54) 255 (37.3) 172 (38.5)
46 (66.7) 377 (55.2) 264 (59.1)
3 (4.3) 54 (18.8) 14 (29.2)
21 (0.6) 66 (1.5) 72 (6.9)
3,818 5,056 1,226
107(2.8) 777 (15.4) 352 (28.7)
3,285 (86.0) 2,705 (53.5) 682 (55.6)
112 (2.9) 253 (5.0) 55 (4.5)
314 (8.2) 1,321 (26.1) 137 (11.2)
2 (2.8) 33 (6.6) 14 (6.6)
56 (52.3) 575 (74.0) 211 (60.0)
62 (57.9) 452 (58.2) 195 (55.4)
0 (0.0) 23 (1.7) 5 (3.6)
8 (0.2) 23 (0.8) 12 (1.7)
d Ziehl-Neelsen microscopy were done on doubtful colonies [15].
terium other than tuberculosis; MTBc, Mycobacterium tuberculosis complex.
Figure 1 Performance in WHO drug susceptibility testing DST
and External quality assessment EQA panels (2010–-2012).
DST = Drug Susceptibility Testing, EQA = External.
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ners as well as open discussions on the possible limita-
tions and finding out the alternative solutions ahead of
time is also crucial.
Understanding the acceptable performance standards
as well as planning the routes to achieving them upfront,
including early monitoring of performance with correct-
ive and preventative action projects, is important if stan-
dards are to be realized. From our experience, this
requires the laboratory to have passed the validation
phase with sensitivity scores of at least 80% as well as
early monitoring of performance indicators for a TB cul-
ture laboratory.
From our findings, culture contamination rates, though
mainly within the acceptable ranges, may potentially in-
crease with increasing workload. The majority of speci-
mens processed in 2011 were from the adolescent study
collected unsupervised from their homes of a distant field
site to the processing laboratory. High contamination
rates from unsupervised samples have also been docu-
mented in previous studies [19,20].
During this period, there was an increase in positivity
rates over the years and this was attributed to the typeFigure 2 Quarterly smear microscopy External quality assessment EQ
Laboratory (2010–-2012). EQA = External , NTRL = National Tuberculosis Rof the studies that were conducted at the laboratory per
year. The laboratory mostly processed samples from in-
fant and adolescent cohort studies from the TB vaccine
preparedness studies seeking to establish baseline epi-
demiological indices for the planned TB vaccine trials
between 2010 and 2011, and adult studies from mainly
HIV-infected TB suspects including TB patients added
on from 2011 to 2012.
There was high mycobacterium other than tubercu-
losis recovery with MGIT culture which also increased
with increasing workload. This is because MGIT has
more nutrients that support recovery of the fast growers
[21,22]. The recovery was high in the year 2011 as this
was the peak for the adolescent cohort study, which
comprised of about 80% of the laboratory workload that
year. The mycobacterium other than tuberculosis rate in
adolescents is consistent with the previous study among
adolescents [23].
There was an increase in the number of smear-
positive but culture-negative patients (Table 4) over the
years due to inclusion of studies that had TB patients
who were on treatment for treatment monitoring/out-
come studies from mid-2011 through 2012. Previous
studies have shown that patients who are on treatment
for monitoring purposes and smear positive are likely to
be culture negative [24-26].
There were exceptional scores from quarterly EQA
performance of smear microscopy with NTRL in 2010
and 2011, with a slight decline in two quarters of 2012
(Figure 2). The decline was attributed to the period of
learning curve for the technologists before their compe-
tency was stabilized. This mainly led to low false nega-
tive smear readings.
Culture scores were 100% for CAP panels (Figure 3)
and were within acceptable range (majority 80% and
above) in all procedures for all years for WHO (Figure 1)
and fair performance (majority 75 and above) for NHLS
(Figure 4). This was possible due to the strict proficiencyA performance with the NTRL National Tuberculosis Reference
eference Laboratory.
Figure 3 Performance with College of American Pathologists’CAP panels by rounds (2011–-2012). CAP = College of American Pathologists.
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and one junior technologist in the section every quarter
to ensure effective competency transfer to the junior
technologist. The scores in the DST for WHO and CAP
were mainly attributable to competency gain across the
years and an oversight in monitoring in the laboratory’s
cold storage system that could have led to loss of po-
tency from the streptomycin drug that was accidently
used in the panels of 2011. The low performance in
2010 were mainly attributed to competency gain phase.
All performances below 100% were investigated and cor-
rective and preventative actions established.
However, our findings had some limitations. First, fail-
ure to use biochemical tests for identification of MTBc
on LJ, instead of morphological identification methods,
may have led to misidentification errors that can lead to
over-estimation of MTBc recovery on LJ. However, this
may not have been the case with our findings as previ-
ous studies in Uganda have indicated less need for non-
morphological methods when using LJ since all growth
from those studies on LJ was for MTBc [20,21]. Secondly,
the number of samples tested during the validation periodFigure 4 Performance in external quality assessment EQA panels from
Diseases and the National Health Laboratory Service.could have been small for a conclusive evidence of
personnel competency and validation. However, the subse-
quent evidence of quality performance overrules that con-
cern. Furthermore, the percentage of smear-positive but
culture-negative results may have suffered an aggregation
effect; disaggregating the figures to indicate the number of
those who were on TB treatment in a given period and
those had never been on TB treatment may show a differ-
ent rate. It is also worth noting that EQA performance
may not always translate to total quality assurance since
acceptable internal measures are required to reduce per-
formance gaps.
Threats and opportunities towards sustainability
After the end of support from the main studies that led
to construction of this facility, the pioneer funders of-
fered one year transitional support and the laboratory
administration was returned to Makerere University.
There were challenges of maintaining the laboratory, in-
cluding the servicing of key equipment and ventilation
system, and non-permanent university staff salaries. How-
ever, operational costs and salaries of the key leadershipNCID/NHLS. NCID/NHLS = the National Institute for Communicable
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by the Makerere University. The laboratory leadership,
through Makerere University, played a big part to alert
possible collaborators of the available opportunity for
collaboration. The good reports of continuous accept-
able laboratory performance from international audi-
tors and monitors, as proof of quality and reliability,
were very instrumental towards attracting more collab-
orators and studies. With the demonstrated quality of
work and acceptable standards achieved up to that
time, the laboratory attracted more research groups
and studies following the pioneer funding. The cost per
test was determined for all tests/services offered based
on the cost of reagents and other consumables as well
as the amount of time required to perform the test, and
the fees generated are used to support salaries and the
maintenance of infrastructure and equipment (biosafety
cabinets, incubators, generator ventilation system, etc.).
There is still a challenge of maintaining the established
safety standards and practices in terms of continuous
acceptability and costs. Furthermore, adequate biosafety
in BSL-3 can mainly be ensured if all concepts are
understood and acted upon and it is a continuous
learning experience [7,27]. Continuous evaluations and
performance improvement projects performed by QMS
and safety officers as well as increased commitment of
the laboratory staff towards achieving acceptable stan-
dards are likely to lessen this threat. There are varia-
tions in minimum safe BSL-3 practices across global
regions of collaborators which are sometimes contra-
dictory and still pose a challenge, for example, the rec-
ommendation or not of the use of a mask in the
containment section, among others [7,27,28].Conclusions
It is feasible to establish a BSL-3 TB culture labora-
tory with acceptable quality performance standards
in resource-limited countries. Early and continuous moni-
toring of performance indicators and corrective actions in
all newly established TB culture facilities is recommended.
The laboratory is currently reliant on research grants for
sustainability. Although efforts are being made to attract
more support from private hospitals and clinics, the
support so far received from these avenues is very low
compared to the expected. There is a greater need of
government support to ensure sustainability of this es-
tablishment, which will contribute to the efforts of TB
control through quality research and development ser-
vices as well as to human resources through the provision
of experts who can contribute to the improvement of
health systems nationally and globally. Future exploration
or assessments of the satisfaction of the laboratory worker
with the BSL-3 laboratory practices and/or researchers oracademia regarding the services offered by this facility in
accordance with its mission are needed.
Policy implications
In line with the Maputo Declaration of 2008 and with the
Uganda National Laboratory Policy of 2009, the establish-
ment of this laboratory is a strong pillar towards improv-
ing and sustaining access to quality laboratory services.
Despite a clear recognition of the need for research and
development toward TB control nationally and globally,
there is little national budget support to research labora-
tories to address human resources, consumables, equip-
ment servicing and maintenance, and training needs.
This facility has increased the capacity to develop and
validate more effective ways to diagnose TB, and it pro-
vides unique training opportunities in TB diagnosis and
clinical research. This laboratory is recognized by the
WHO Stop TB Partnership as a regional training center
for non-commercial DST methods, registered for CAP ac-
creditation, approved for AIDS Clinical Trials Group,
International Maternal Pediatric Adolescent AIDS Clinical
Trials Group (IMPAACT), and the Global TB Drug Devel-
opment Alliance (TB alliance), as well as by Tuberculosis
Clinical and Diagnostic Research Consortium (TBCDRC)
studies. The high skilled experts in this research laboratory
also continue to provide an excellent resource for the
needed of national discussion of the laboratory system,
participate in quality management systems, and provide a
forum for open discussions between service delivery and
research laboratories in line with the Maputo Declaration
of 2008. The Ugandan government must not only
recognize the need but also support the sustainability of
this research facility as part of the greater health system.
Additional files
Additional file 1: Sample reception area of the biosafety level 3
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laboratory.
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